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Reasoning for Deliberative Democracy
Abstract
Talking it out with others vs. deliberation within and the law of group polarization: Some implications
of the argumentative theory of reasoning for deliberative democracy. This paper argues that a new
psychological theory—the argumentative theory of reasoning—provides theoretical support for the
discursive, dialogical ideal of democratic deliberation. It converges, in particular, with deliberative democrats’
predictions about the positive epistemic properties of talking things out with others. The paper further
considers two influential objections to democratic deliberation: first, that “deliberation within” rather than
deliberation with others carries most of the burden in terms of changing people’s minds; and second, that the
so-called “law of group polarization” casts serious doubts on the value of democratic deliberation and, more
generally, the ideal of deliberative democracy. Keywords: deliberative democracy; argumentative theory of
reasoning; epistemic democracy; law of group polarization.
Resolução de diferenças com os outros através do diálogo vs. deliberação interna e a lei de polarização
do grupo: Algumas implicações da teoria argumentativa do pensamento na democracia deliberativa.
Este artigo defende que uma nova teoria psicológica – a teoria argumentativa do pensamento – fornece uma
base teórica ao ideal discursivo e dialógico da deliberação democrática. Converge, em particular, com as
previsões dos democratas deliberativos acerca das propriedades epistémicas positivas da resolução de
diferenças através do diálogo. O presente artigo considera ainda duas objeções importantes à deliberação
democrática: em primeiro lugar, que a “deliberação interna”, mais do que a deliberação com outros, tem uma
maior responsabilidade em termos da alteração das ideias dos indivíduos; e, em segundo lugar, que a chamada
«lei de polarização do grupo» coloca sérias dúvidas acerca do valor da deliberação democrática e, de uma
forma mais geral, acerca do ideal da democracia deliberativa.
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Talking it out with others vs. deliberation
within and the law of group polarization:
Some implications of the argumentative theory
of reasoning for deliberative democracy
The ideal of democratic deliberation at the heart of theories of deliberative 
democracies has been criticized from many fronts since its first formulation in 
the late 1980s. As a normative ideal, it is often attacked for being too demand-
ing and too utopian to be worth pursuing. At one extreme, critics argue that 
democratic deliberation, in practice, does not do as much to change people’s 
minds as the monological reflection of “deliberation within” (Goodin and 
 Niemeyer, 2003; Goodin, 2000, 2003 and 2008); at the other extreme, oth-
ers argue that it changes minds, but for the worse due to “the law of group 
polarization,” whereby like-minded groups simply tend toward more extreme 
versions of their own starting points (Sunstein, 2002). Given the extent of this 
problem, we have good reasons for preferring simple judgment aggregation to 
deliberation (Sunstein, 2002;  Surowiecki, 2004).
Empirical results in political science and social psychology seem to 
 buttress this skeptical view. Sometimes group deliberation homogenizes atti-
tudes, sometimes it polarizes them; sometimes group decisions are  better 
than  individual decisions, sometimes not (see e. g. Kerr, MacCoun and 
Kramer, 1996). As Dennis Thompson (2008, p. 499) remarks, when it comes 
to evaluating what democratic deliberation does and whether it does any-
thing good, “the general conclusion of surveys of the empirical research so 
far is that taken together the findings are mixed or inconclusive.” Even the 
results observed in James Fishkin’s (2009) deliberative polls—conducted 
with success across the globe, including in societies divided along religious 
or linguistic lines—do not entirely settle the question. Deliberative polls are 
designed in such a way that they give us only the roughest of indications 
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that  post-deliberative views are “better” than pre-deliberative views, in the 
sense that the usual suspects for poor epistemic outcomes (group polariza-
tion, lack of information, lack of diversity, lack of single peakedness, etc.) 
have not afflicted the deliberations.1
Few democratic theorists, it seems fair to assume, would be willing 
to claim that the normative ideal of democratic deliberation can remain 
immune to empirical challenges. Most of them are or ought to be bothered 
by the remaining uncertainty regarding the epistemic properties of demo-
cratic deliberation, particularly on salient issues.2 Part of the problem with 
the current literature lies in the fact that “deliberation” is not always properly 
construed in the experiments aimed at measuring its effects; moreover, the 
standards by which the transformative and epistemic properties of deliber-
ation are measured (ranging from various factual and logical standards to 
more vague notions of “betterness”) are often inconsistent across experiments 
or even irrelevant.3 Perhaps conducting more specifically designed experi-
ments in the future might yield more definitive results, one way or the other. 
Thus, one way to resolve the current ambiguity of empirical results might 
be to keep running experiments and, for example, more explicitly epistemic 
studies of deliberative polls.
Another approach, which is not exclusive of the empirical route, consists 
of going back to the theory of deliberative democracy to confront the model of 
democratic deliberation at its normative core, using theoretical insights from 
other disciplines. Deliberative democracy has undeniably benefited from 
engagement with the results of empirical studies of deliberation in political 
1 For a recent effort at identifying more precisely what does the transformative work in deli-
berative polls, see Farrar et al. (2010). The results presented in this article go some way toward 
demonstrating that deliberation has epistemic properties but they are far from conclusive. 
Indeed, what the results show is that something happens during the formal, face-to-face delibe-
ration in contrast with the informal deliberation phase that precedes it. The study, however, does 
not really open the black box of deliberation per se. Furthermore, it remains to be shown that 
more informed opinions contribute to better judgments overall, as measured against a proce-
dure-independent standard of correctness that is not purely factual. While it is indeed likely that 
more informed opinions correlate with better political judgments, this is not necessary. In order 
to verify this assumption, the experiments would have to be framed in explicitly epistemic terms 
rather than in terms of measuring a variation in pre-deliberative and post-deliberative opinions.
2 As to the deliberative democrats who care about deliberation for strictly non-epistemic 
reasons, they should at least care that deliberation not wreak epistemic havoc.
3 In Farrar et al. (2010; see above), the experiment does not prove that people actually used 
arguments—as we insist that deliberation properly construed requires—simply that they chan-
ged their views on some issues.
 ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY OF REASONING AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 913
science and psychology.4 Similarly, deliberative democracy can be enriched 
by considering other disciplines’ theoretical approaches to deliberation. Such 
a confrontation could help isolate different aspects of deliberation, helping us 
to better understand what the epistemic benefits (if any) of deliberation are, 
and where they lie.
Arguably, one discipline that has not been properly tapped is psychology—
particularly evolutionary psychology. Deliberative democrats that have turned 
to social psychology have for the most past simply borrowed the conclusions 
of laboratory or natural experiments, without questioning the theoretical 
framework behind the experiments themselves. One assumption behind these 
experiments, however, can no longer be taken for granted. According to what 
Mercier and Sperber (2011a and 2011b) have dubbed the “classical theory of 
reasoning”, the main function of reasoning is to help individuals improve their 
beliefs by reflecting upon them. This theory, however, fails to make sense of 
much of the available empirical evidence. A more promising alternative now 
exists: the “argumentative theory of reasoning” (Mercier and Sperber, 2011a 
and 2011b; Mercier and Landemore, 2012; Sperber, 2001; see also Billig, 1996; 
Gibbard, 1990). The argumentative theory of reasoning posits a new evolu-
tionary function for reasoning: argumentation with others, rather than private 
ratiocination.5 Our paper seeks to derive some of the implications of this new 
psychological theory for the theory of deliberative democracy.
The first section of the paper presents the argumentative theory of rea-
soning and clarifies the nature of the implications it may have for demo-
cratic theory and, specifically, for the debate between advocates and critics of 
the deliberative ideal. The two subsequent sections aim to refute two major 
objections to the application of the argumentative theory of reasoning to the 
case of democratic deliberation’s epistemic properties, and show that these 
objections are, ultimately, weak. The two objections considered are, first, 
Goodin and Niemeyer’s argument against so-called “external deliberation” 
and in favor of “deliberation within,” and, second, Cass Sunstein’s influen-
tial critique of deliberation based on the alleged existence of a “law of group 
polarization.”
4 See reviews of this literature in, e. g., Mendelberg (2002); Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs 
(2004); and Ryfe (2005). This empirical literature has tested some of the implicit predictions 
contained in the normative model of deliberative democracy and brought to the attention of 
theorists the real-life constraints weighing on their ideal.
5 See also Mercier and Landemore (2012), in which the authors show how this new theory 
can make sense of contradictory data on the successes and failures of deliberation.
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T H E A RG UM E N TAT I V E T H E ORY
OF R E AS ON I NG A N D DE L I BE R AT I V E DE MO C R AC Y
The argumentative theory of reasoning defines reasoning as a specific cogni-
tive mechanism that aims at finding and evaluating reasons, so that individuals 
can convince other people and evaluate their arguments.
This definition may seem quite intuitive and obvious, but it is, in fact, a 
marked break from another theory of reasoning that continues to domi-
nate contemporary psychology, in particular the psychology of reasoning 
and decision-making. According to this more “classical” view of reasoning, 
reasoning allows us to improve our epistemic status by correcting our own 
beliefs and intuitions, and building on these foundations to reach knowledge 
and improve the correctness of our judgments and decisions (Evans and Over, 
1996;  Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). Although dominant in psychology, 
this theory runs into problems at the empirical level, where it cannot account 
for a wealth of data about the imperfections of individual reasoning.
Indeed, it is well established in psychology that when reasoning is used 
internally to generate knowledge and make better decisions, its performance 
is often disappointing. People have trouble understanding simple arguments 
in abstract, de-contextualized form (Evans, 2002; Wason, 1966; Wason and 
Brooks, 1979). Reasoning often fails to override intuitions that are blatantly 
wrong (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994; Frederick, 2005). In some cases, more 
reasoning can even lead to worse outcomes: it can make us too sure of our-
selves (Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980), allow us to maintain discred-
ited beliefs (Guenther and Alicke, 2008; Ross, Lepper and Hubbard, 1975), 
and drive us toward poor decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Shafir, Simonson, 
 Tversky, 1993; Wilson and Schooler, 1991). On the classical approach to rea-
soning, these empirical findings are profoundly disturbing because it seems 
that human reasoning is deeply flawed and in need of correction. A major 
problem for the classical theory, in particular, is the existence of the “confirma-
tion bias,” a well-established tendency to seek arguments that bolster the side 
that the reasoner already favors (Nickerson, 1998).
As a tool for individual use, reasoning thus does not appear to be particu-
larly compelling. The argumentative theory of reasoning proposes to abandon 
the classical theory and replace it with an hypothesis generated with a different 
method, that of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists rely on the 
heuristic value of evolutionary theory (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 2002) to 
make and test predictions regarding behavior and psychological mechanisms, 
some of which may seem otherwise puzzling, such as lapses in memory (Klein 
et al., 2002). Evolutionary psychologists thus seek  functional explanations—
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that is, explanations that account for features of a trait by appealing to its func-
tion, i. e., the production of certain beneficial consequences (see also Elster, 
2007; Hardin, 1980). Such functional explanations are particularly appealing 
when a psychological mechanism introduces some apparent systematic distor-
tion rather than random error (which could plausibly be explained by limited 
capacity). Reasoning certainly exhibits such systematic biases, most strikingly 
in the aforementioned case of the confirmation bias.
Evolutionary theory suggests that if individual reasoning is rather bad at 
figuring out the truth when used internally, then this cannot be its main func-
tion. Based on ideas introduced by Dan Sperber (2000 and 2001), the argumen-
tative theory of reasoning has thus been developed to account for reasoning’s 
features, including its biases, in a way that makes evolutionary sense of them. 
Instead of assuming, as the classical theory does, that the function of reasoning 
is to allow lone reasoners to improve their epistemic status through ratiocina-
tion, proponents of the new theory hypothesize that the function of reasoning 
is to find and evaluate reasons, so that individuals can convince other people 
and evaluate their arguments in dialogic contexts (Mercier and Sperber, 2011a 
and 2011b; Mercier and Landemore, 2012; Sperber, 2001; see also Billig, 1996; 
Gibbard, 1990).
The argumentative theory of reasoning thus breaks with the classical view 
first in the way it reaches its main hypothesis and, second, in the content of this 
hypothesis. By so doing, the argumentative approach is able to interpret what 
seemed like vices as virtues. If the goal of reasoning is to convince others, then 
the confirmation bias is actually useful, since it leads to the identification of 
arguments that can be used to achieve this goal. Likewise, we can make sense 
of the fact that people are generally good at falsifying statements that oppose 
their own views.
The relationship of the argumentative function to truth-finding is com-
plex and worth emphasizing, especially in contrast to the more straightfor-
ward classical theory according to which one of the functions of reasoning 
in individuals is to figure out the truth about the world. In the argumentative 
theory of reasoning we need to distinguish between the complementary tasks 
of the argumentative function of reasoning, namely that of producing argu-
ments for one’s beliefs and that of assessing the arguments advanced by others. 
As far as the production of arguments is concerned, reasoning has (and should 
have) little concern for the pursuit of objective truth since its main function is 
to derive support for beliefs already accepted as true. When individuals wish 
to convince others of a given proposition, they generally do not check if the 
proposition is true since they already believe it. All they are interested in is 
finding good arguments to support the proposition and convince the listener. 
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By contrast, as listeners and receivers of arguments, individuals want to be able 
to evaluate arguments—that is, assess their epistemic soundness—in order to 
decide whether they should accept their conclusions or not. As far as this eval-
uative task of reasoning is concerned, it is indirectly concerned with the truth 
since individuals want to be able to change their mind when it is epistemically 
warranted.
One implication of the argumentative theory of reasoning is that the nor-
mal conditions for reasoning are social and, more specifically, deliberative. 
Here it should be noted that the term “normal” has no normative/moral con-
notations, but simply refers to a set of facts about the conditions in which we 
claim that reasoning evolved (as in Millikan, 1984). The normal conditions for 
the use of reasoning are, according to the argumentative theory of reasoning, 
those of deliberation with at least another person and the abnormal ones those 
of the solitary mind or non-deliberating groups. This emphasis of the theory 
on the social, intersubjective dimension of reasoning makes it particularly 
congenial with the core elements of deliberative democracy.
Deliberative democracy is a general umbrella in democratic theory for 
various theories that trace the legitimacy of political authority and political 
laws and decisions to deliberation among free and equal citizens (e. g., Cohen, 
1989, p. 22). Deliberative democrats emphasize democracy as government by 
discussion and, specifically, rational deliberation, by which is meant a process 
of reason-giving among citizens about matters of the common good. While the 
term “deliberative democracy” itself was coined by Joseph Bessette (1980 and 
1994), the theory has been elaborated by a number of authors (e. g., Benhabib, 
1996; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1986; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996 
and 2002; Habermas, 1991 and 1996 and Rawls, 1971 and 19936). The roots of 
the theory can be traced as far back as Aristotle, through Kant and J. S. Mill, 
6 Rawls is arguably a slightly ambiguous deliberative democrat to the extent that the model 
of the original position in A Theory of Justice (1971) involves individuals placed behind a veil 
of ignorance that turns them into rational clones. As a commentator remarked, “[t]his is deli-
beration of a sort but only in terms of the weighing of arguments in the mind, not testing them 
in real political interaction… [It] downplays the social or interactive aspect of deliberation” 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 15). By contrast, Habermas and others put forward the ideal of a more expli-
citly dialogical and intersubjective exchange in which the participants are supposed to maintain 
their concrete differences even as they seek a rational consensus (Habermas, 1995, p. 113). In his 
later work, Rawls substituted his own arguably overly monological ideal of deliberation among 
rational individuals placed under a veil of ignorance and seeking unanimous agreement with 
the more realistic and dialogical ideal of deliberation among “reasonable” individuals seeking 
an “overlapping consensus.” In its latest formulations, Rawls’ deliberative ideal arguably came to 
converge toward that of Habermas. See Rawls (1995); see also the analysis by McGann (2006, 
pp. 161-166).
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although the most interesting heritage for our purpose is probably classical 
American pragmatism.
Pragmatists, more so even than contemporary deliberative democrats, 
have perceptively emphasized the psychology of the individual mind as essen-
tially dialogical and intersubjective, emerging and constructed in large part 
in discursive interactions with others. John Dewey thus thought that “social 
intelligence” would emerge from direct deliberation among the members 
of the public, in their concomitant use of the embodied knowledge of past 
generations, rather than be produced by lone minds, whether of geniuses 
or political elites (Dewey, 1954 [1927], p. 218). George Herbert Mead spe-
cifically contended that “we must regard mind … as arising and developing 
within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions” 
(Mead, 1934, p. 133). The deliberative pragmatic tradition can thus be said 
to anticipate in crucial ways the core insight of the argumentative theory of 
reasoning that the normal context of reasoning is deliberative and fundamen-
tally social.7
The boundaries of what counts as deliberation have been the object of 
some contestation among contemporary deliberative democrats—arguably 
pitting “Type i” deliberation theorists, who stick to a narrow concept of 
deliberation as an exchange of arguments in search of a rational consensus, 
against “Type ii” deliberation theorists, who pursue a more empirical agenda 
and favor a more flexible and inclusive definition (Bächtiger et al., 2010). 
The disagreement between the two groups should not, however, overshadow 
what they have in common. Both “Types” favor the role of reasoning and 
argumentation in deliberation. Even “Type ii” theorists, who argue for more 
inclusive definitions of deliberation that make room for non-rational dis-
course like story-telling or emotional language (e. g. Mouffe, 1998;  Sanders, 
1997; Young, 2000), in the end reserve a certain normative priority for argu-
mentation over other forms of communication (see Dryzek, 2000, p. 48). The 
core definition of deliberation thus remains stable across both Type i and 
Type ii deliberation theorists, as “an exchange of arguments for or against 
something” (as per Aristotle, 1991, i. 2). In deliberative exchanges, it is 
assumed that one of the main goals is to convince others through rationally 
persuasive arguments.
7 Note, however, that whereas classical pragmatists liked to talk about the “mind” as “social,” 
the argumentative theory of reasoning more modestly but also more accurately focuses on one 
specific mechanism of the mind, namely reasoning. The argumentative theory of reasoning thus 
integrates conceptual findings (such as evolutionary theory and the modularity of mind) as well 
as empirical data that were simply not available to these early predecessors.
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In keeping with this focus on reasoning arguably shared by deliberative 
democrats from the classical pragmatists to their contemporary heirs, the new 
psychological theory of reasoning proposed here offers the following defini-
tion of deliberation: an activity is deliberative to the extent that reasoning is 
used to gather and evaluate arguments for and against a given proposition (see 
also Mercier and Landemore, 2012). This definition makes reasoning a center-
piece of deliberation. First, the cognitive activity of reasoning—the usage of 
“central” as opposed to “peripheral” routes—is crucial. Thus, the content of the 
utterances being exchanged is not all that matters; the way they are generated 
is important as well (two actors reciting from memory the scripted text of a 
deliberation would not be deliberating per se). Second, the definition stresses 
the necessity of an exchange, or more precisely, a feedback loop between rea-
soning from at least two points of view. Assuming that two people each hold 
one point of view, the following chain of events is required for genuine delib-
eration to take place: person a uses reasoning to make an argument from point 
of view a; person b uses reasoning to examine a’s argument from point of view 
b, which is at least partially opposed to point of view a; person b then uses 
reasoning to create an argument that partially or fully opposes the previous 
argument from the point of view b; a uses reasoning to examine b’s argument 
from point of view a. Notice that the definition of deliberation presented here 
allows for the possibility of “internal” as well as “external” deliberation, since 
it is possible—although often difficult—for even a lone reasoner to find argu-
ments for an opposite point of view than hers.8 The definition of delibera-
tion embraced by the argumentative theory of reasoning thus draws a sharp 
distinction between proper deliberation, which centrally involves the mental 
activity specified above (reasoning), and conversation or discussion, which 
may not involve this specific mental activity at all.9
In its relation to deliberative democracy, the general implications of the 
argumentative theory of reasoning are the following:
8 If a internally engages in such an exchange of arguments between the two points of view 
a and b, then this person is truly deliberating, in her head, with her internal representation of 
b’s point of view. Notice, importantly, that if a finds arguments supporting her own point of 
view only, then she will still be reasoning, but deliberation will not have taken place. Similarly, a 
group of people who all think like a and find arguments supporting the point of view a are not 
properly deliberating, even if these arguments are different from theirs, as long as they support 
the same position.
9 Manin (2005) has himself called “debate” the type of argumentative deliberation that we 
embrace, by contrast with discussion. We do not use that term but simply narrow down our con-
cept of deliberation to exclude mere discussion from it. Notice also that we are not saying that in 
the phenomenon of group polarization, people do not reason, simply that they do not deliberate.
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1. The theory predicts that even genuinely truth-oriented individuals—
that is participants in the deliberation animated by a sincere desire to 
figure out the truth (for example, about what the public good requires 
or the implications of a given policy) in contrast to partisans, ideo-
logues, or strategic rhetoricians—will have a hard time fighting their 
hard-wired confirmation bias. What the argumentative theory of rea-
soning implies, therefore, in a non-normative and purely prudential 
way, is that if deliberative democrats care about the epistemic proper-
ties of democratic deliberation, they should ensure that deliberation 
is conducted in such a way as to ensure that individual confirmation 
biases do not produce epistemic damages.
2. Reasoning is more likely to yield epistemic benefits for both the indivi-
dual and the group—that is, to be conducive to true or truer individual 
and collective beliefs—when it takes place in its normal, deliberative 
context.10 The idea is that even if the function of reasoning is argu-
mentative—to produce and evaluate arguments—rather than purely 
epistemic, it should still lead to an improvement in epistemic status, at 
both the individual and collective level. Otherwise there would be no 
point in listening to other people’s arguments—and then no point in 
making any argument.
Before proceeding any further, two potential sources of misunderstanding 
must be dispelled. First, the claims made by the argumentative theory of rea-
soning are descriptive; they can be true or false, but they have no direct impli-
cations in terms of what is morally right or wrong or in terms of the norms 
that ought to guide deliberators. In fact the argumentative theory of reasoning 
is compatible with many normative views of politics and does not carry a nor-
mative agenda by itself. In particular, even though the argumentative theory 
of reasoning claims that reasoning has evolved primarily in order to convince 
others and assess their arguments, it does not mean that the theory advocates 
for a policy of power struggle, partisanship, or manipulation. Despite its lack of 
a normative agenda, however the argumentative theory of reasoning provides 
theoretical ammunition for advocates of deliberative democracy who argue 
10 Of course, the claims made here are only probabilistic. It is possible for an individual to 
apply herself and successfully think up counter-arguments to her prior views. Similarly, it is pos-
sible for like-minded groups to do the same thing, for example by assigning someone the role 
of the devil’s advocate. The theory simply posits that given what we know of the strength of the 
confirmation bias and the mental discipline it requires for people to fight it, solitary reasoning 
or reasoning with like-minded people is less likely to lead to good epistemic outcomes.
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on the basis of the epistemic properties of democratic deliberation. The argu-
mentative theory of reasoning is thus not only compatible with an epistemic, 
deliberative approach to democracy but, as this paper argues, its predictions 
converge with the predictions of deliberative democrats.
Second, as mentioned above, the argumentative theory of reasoning does not 
divorce reasoning entirely from truth-seeking. Truth remains on the  horizon of 
the argumentative theory of reasoning: reasoning also has the  purpose of eval-
uating arguments, which forces arguers to make (mostly) sound arguments. 
People may occasionally be fooled by rhetoric and well-phrased lies, but it is 
ultimately easier to convince people when what you say is true and can  sustain 
cool and reflective examination. Convincing others is conceptually distinct 
from merely persuading them. Persuasion has to do with the  package in which 
a message comes (the rhetoric of it), whereas conviction has to do with the sub-
stance of the argument. Regarding evaluation, reasoning seeks truth either in 
the recognition of the force of the opponent’s argument (what  Habermas calls 
“the unforced force of the better argument”) or, less directly, through attempts 
at falsifying it. There is thus no necessary disconnection between truth seeking 
and the function of reasoning, although the relationship is, the theory argues, 
first and foremost through the function of arguing with others.
In the same way that the empirical findings about the properties of demo-
cratic deliberation may help reformulate or reconsider various ideals of delib-
erative democracy, using the right theory of reasoning may help deliberative 
democrats to better understand when and where deliberation is likely to work, 
and thus help refine the deliberative democracy ideal.
The rest of this paper seeks to demonstrate that the argumentative theory 
of reasoning is a promising candidate for such a task by outlining the theory’s 
predictions for the epistemic properties of deliberation in response to two clas-
sical objections to deliberative democracy—in particular, the claim that demo-
cratic deliberation does not do much to change people’s minds, or that (when 
it changes them), it changes them for the worse. In the next section, we first 
consider the case on which Goodin and Niemeyer build their recommenda-
tion against external deliberation and for “deliberation within.”
DE L I BE R AT ION W I T H I N V E R SU S DE L I BE R AT ION W I T H OT H E R S
The argumentative theory of reasoning predicts that it is usually delibera-
tion with others, rather than solitary reasoning, which will have the desired 
transformative and epistemic properties. Specifically, the theory predicts that 
external-collective processes, rather than internal-reflective processes, should 
be at least as central to the process of democratic deliberation as deliberative 
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 democrats commonly suppose. Some democratic theorists, however, have 
advanced the opposite thesis.
Goodin and Niemeyer (2003; see also Goodin, 2008) thus bemoan the fact 
that since the deliberative turn in the 1990s, most theorists have moved away 
from the monological ideal of deliberation at the heart of Rawls’ early model of 
the original position, instead embracing Habermas’ later emphasis on actual, 
interpersonal engagements. For Goodin and Niemeyer, this move away from 
hypothetical imagined discourse toward actual deliberation is misguided 
because, for them, it is “deliberation within” rather than talking with others—
or “external deliberation”—that should be the focus of theories of deliberative 
democracy. 11
Goodin first coined the expression “deliberation within” as a way to cap-
ture the pondering of reasons that goes on in an individual’s mind prior to and 
during his engagement in deliberation with others. This pondering of reasons 
involves an exercise in reflection and imagination, in which one is supposed 
to put oneself in other people’s shoes and imagine what their arguments might 
be. In that sense, deliberation within is not unlike the hypothetical, mono-
logical type of ratiocination defended by Rawls. By contrast, Goodin labels 
“ external deliberation” the type of discursive exchanges whereby a group col-
lectively ponders the reasons defended by different individuals.12
One of the motivations for this embrace of deliberation within over 
deliberation with others is, importantly, the unfeasibility of group delibera-
tion on the mass scale of existing democracies and, conversely, the obvious 
feasibility, at any scale, of deliberation within. If it can be shown that—even 
in the “minipublics”13 studied by Goodin and Niemeyer—what does most 
of the work is actually a form of internal ratiocination rather than discursive 
11 While the original article by Goodin and Niemeyer is from 2003, all the citations in this 
section will be to its latest version as a chapter in Goodin (2008).
12 The choice of “external” to characterize the deliberation that goes on in social settings is 
slightly misleading in that it suggests that in deliberation with others, ideas are processed in the 
ether, outside of anyone’s heads. Of course, the actual processing of arguments is always taking 
place in someone’s head, not in some fictitious ‘group mind’. But the idea expressed by ‘external 
deliberation’ is that when many individuals deliberate, their parallel individual reasoning takes 
as an input the output of at least one other person in the group, rather than functioning in 
autarky and generating all the arguments pro and con from the inside. To avoid the ambiguity, 
this paper uses the expression “deliberation with others.”
13 A minipublic is “a deliberative forum consisting of 20-500 participants, focused on a par-
ticular issue, selected as a representative sample of the public affected by the issue, and conve-
ned for a period of time sufficient for participants to form considered opinions and judgments. 
Examples of minipublics include deliberative polling, citizen juries, consensus conferences and 
citizen assemblies.” See Warren (2008, p. 1).
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exchange, there would be reason to think that where group deliberation is 
not feasible, it can easily be replaced by internal deliberation. Thus, on a large 
scale (especially), the ideal of deliberation would have to be less discursive and 
interpersonal, and more self-reflective and intra-personal.
The other main reason why Goodin and Niemeyer think we should return 
our focus to hypothetical/monological rather than actual/dialogical delibera-
tion is that as far as changing people’s minds, deliberation within is also where 
the action is. Asking “When does deliberation begin?”, they answer that not 
only does deliberation begin in the head of individuals prior to their engage-
ment in social and interactive deliberation, but that much of the work of delib-
eration ends there. Whatever is later externalized or talked out does not do as 
much as what happened earlier in the privacy of people’s minds. For Goodin 
and Niemeyer, there seems to be both a chronological and epistemic priority 
of deliberation within over deliberation with others. In fact, they argue that 
the point of external deliberation is largely democratic legitimation, beyond 
which it does not do much, epistemically speaking (Goodin, 2008, pp. 39-40). 
According to them, “much (maybe most) of the work of deliberation occurs 
well before the formal proceedings [of public deliberative processes]—before 
the organized “talking together”—ever begin” (p. 40).
Goodin and Niemeyer’s claim relies on the case study of a specific “mini-
public,” an Australian citizen’s jury convened in January 2000 to discuss policy 
options for a controversial road, called the Bloomfield Track, running through 
an Australian rainforest. The issue was, roughly, to decide how to reconcile the 
problem of community access and environmental concerns for the unique com-
bination of rainforest and coastal reef endangered by the track. Without going 
too much into the specifics of the citizen’s jury organization, what the analysis 
brings into relief is how most of the attitudinal changes in jury members took 
place prior to actual formal deliberation with other jury members. During this 
“information” phase, jurors visited the rain forest and the Bloomfield track, 
and were given background briefings and presentations by an assembly of wit-
nesses. Though the phase allowed for verbal exchanges between jurors, on site, 
and over tea and lunch at different points, none of them were as organized as 
the official deliberation phase. As Goodin and  Niemeyer explicitly define delib-
eration in the narrower sense of “collectively organized conversations among a 
group of coequals aiming at reacting (or moving towards) some joint view on 
some issues of common concern,” casual interpersonal exchanges during the 
information phase do not qualify as external deliberation (p. 48, our emphasis).
Substantively speaking, what happened during the information phase is 
that jurors initially concerned about the impact of the Bloomfield Track on 
the nearby coral reefs were no longer so worried halfway through it. Similarly, 
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jurors who initially worried about the importance of the track for tourism 
and as an access road for people living in remote northern towns were largely 
reassured. By contrast, during the discussion phase, a similarly large change 
occurred in attitudes toward only one proposition: “I will be made worse off 
by any decision about the Bloomfield Track.” While the jurors worried that this 
might be true throughout the information phase, their fear started to dissipate 
over the course of the formal deliberation.
According to Goodin and Niemeyer’s reading of the experiment, the infor-
mation phase was much more important than the deliberation phase in trans-
forming jurors’ policy preferences:
the simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the 
issues, and listening to what experts had to say did all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. 
Talking among themselves, as a jury, did virtually none of it (pp. 58-59).
This would seem to establish the crucial importance of deliberation within 
and the lesser importance of external deliberation.
Such a finding, they argue, has potentially important implications for 
deliberative democracy. To the extent that it is possible to extrapolate from the 
micro-deliberation of a jury to the macro-deliberations of mass democracy, 
there are lessons to be drawn from the first to improve the practice of the sec-
ond. Goodin and Niemeyer thus invite us to speculate that much of the change 
of opinions that occurs in mass democracy could be due not so much to any 
formal, organized group discussion—presumably those in national assemblies 
between representatives as well as those taking place in town-hall meetings or 
during such events as AmericaSpeaks or Deliberation Day—but to the internal 
reflection individually conducted ahead of those, “within individuals them-
selves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized 
group discussion” (p. 59). This is a rather good thing, in their view, if actual, 
mass scale group deliberation is unfeasible.
Goodin and Niemeyer’s argument runs directly counter to the predictions 
of other deliberative democrats and the proponents of the argumentative the-
ory of reasoning, that deliberation is more likely to have positive epistemic 
properties in the dialogical context of group reasoning than in the monologi-
cal context of individual reasoning. Their argument, however, relies on a rela-
tively weak empirical case.
First, even if one case study were enough to support the case for delibera-
tion within against external deliberation, it would not be clear that the example 
shows as much as Goodin and Niemeyer say it does. To start, the informa-
tional phase is far from pure and in fact contains many deliberative features 
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that could be credited for the change of jurors’ minds, rather than any internal 
deliberation. Indeed, Goodin and Niemeyer themselves grant that much of the 
work of the first (informative) phase was done discursively.14 Insisting, then, 
on keeping the information and deliberation phases separate and attributing 
all the merit of opinion change to the first phase, seems artificial. To be sure, 
the “formal official task of the citizens’ jury” was in one case gathering infor-
mation and, in the other, deliberating (p. 48). But the fact that much of the rea-
soning that prompted the jurors’ changes of minds occurred in the first phase 
cannot be attributed to internal deliberation alone, to the extent that informal 
and formal exchanges between jurors at that point contained arguments for 
or against keeping the track. Since none of the content of the exchanges dur-
ing that first information phase is documented—only the content of opinions 
at different points in the experiment is measured—it is very difficult to judge 
whether this information phase should not instead be recast as informal delib-
eration.15
Related to this, a second problem arises with the construction of the 
experiment itself: the fact that jurors themselves perceived that their prefer-
ences had changed more during the information phase16 may be an artifact of 
14 “Witnesses talked, they were interrogated, and so on. There was also much talking among 
jurors themselves, both informally (over lunch or tea) and formally (in deciding what questions 
to ask of witnesses)” (p. 47).
15 To be fair, Goodin and Niemeyer take that objection into account when they remark that 
the fact that some discussion took place in the first phase of the jury discussion might make it 
“a model of deliberation in the public sphere of ‘civil society.’” In other words, they admit that 
the experiment did not so much juxtapose an information and a deliberation phase, as an infor-
mal with a formal deliberative phase. We think this is a rather powerful objection. Goodin and 
 Niemeyer, however, simply counter it by claiming that the Bloomfield track had long been a con-
tentious issue within the public sphere of which jurors were already part prior to engaging in that 
particular jury, so that “something in that initial phase of the jury must have made a difference 
to them, that informal discussions in the public sphere had previously not.” A critique may well 
grant the point and yet deny that that “something” had anything to do with deliberation within 
and all to do with a higher motivation to listen to what is said in the minipublic sphere of the 
jury than to what was ever said in the larger public sphere. The higher motivation itself could 
be explained by, say, a heightened sense of efficacy in the smaller rather than the larger public 
sphere. The same analysis about the role of motivation as a stimulant to reasoning could be 
applied to a recent paper by Muhlberger and Weber (2006), which seems to support Goodin and 
Niemeyer’s conclusion in establishing the superiority of information over deliberation. In both 
reported experiments, all participants are anticipating the prospect of group deliberation, even 
if they have not yet taken part in group deliberation or will not formally do so. In both cases, it 
could very well be this motivating factor that does the work, rather than deliberation within.
16 Three quarters of the jurors thought discussion was the least important factor in explaining 
their change of mind (Goodin, 2008, p. 51).
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the way the experiment was presented to them. Even if informal deliberation 
took place during the first phase, jurors were encouraged by the questionnaire 
to conceptualize the first phase not as discussion but instead as information, 
which might plausibly affect their perception of what occurred during each 
phase.
These limitations, partially acknowledged by Goodin and Niemeyer them-
selves, cast some doubt upon the general validity of their conclusion. As a 
result, it can be argued that Goodin and Niemeyer’s results do not make a 
strong case for deliberation within as preferable to deliberation with others, 
at least where deliberation with others is feasible. Thus, in spite of the case 
they present, the argumentative theory of reasoning remains unharmed, along 
with its prediction of the epistemic superiority of deliberation with others over 
deliberation within.
The claim put forward by the argumentative theory of reasoning that 
the normal condition of reasoning is deliberation with others rather than 
deliberation within does not mean that people can never properly reason by 
themselves. In fact, recent results show that it is both possible and sometimes 
desirable to stimulate deliberation within where there is an anticipation that an 
individual might at least have to participate in group deliberation and defend 
their arguments to others (Muhlberger and Weber, 2006; see also the litera-
ture on accountability reviewed (for instance) in Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). 
Conversely, it is likely that after experiencing deliberation with others in a 
minipublic on one subject, individuals are then more capable of replicating the 
process of reasoning from different perspectives. It is perhaps even possible to 
prime individuals to reason alone in an argumentative sense, despite a natural 
tendency for them not to do so.
Nonetheless, the argumentative theory of reasoning does suggest a certain 
priority, if not superiority, of deliberation with others over internal delibera-
tion: while human beings do not need an actual collective deliberation to be 
able to reason properly, the fact that the normal conditions of reasoning are 
those where one naturally encounters a variety of points of view makes it more 
likely that reasoning—in particular the part of it that has to do with the evalu-
ation of arguments—will occur when individuals talk things out with others 
than when they try to think it through by themselves.
Talking things out with others, however, is not foolproof, and group 
deliberation will not always have the hoped-for epistemic properties. Let us 
now see how the argumentative theory of reasoning fares when confronted 
with another classical objection raised against democratic deliberation: the 
 so-called “law of group polarization.” The next section explains what the chal-
lenge is and how the theory is equipped to answer it.
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T H E OB J E C T ION F ROM T H E “L AW OF G ROU P P OL A R I Z AT ION ”
In different books and in an influential article, Cass Sunstein (2002) has 
argued that a major problem for democratic deliberation and, more generally, 
deliberative democracy, is what he calls “the law of group polarization” or the 
tendency for a group already sharing some views to become more extreme in 
these views following joint discussion. Of course, among polarizing groups, 
there might be some that actually converge on the truth, so polarization need 
not always indicate that deliberation makes things worse. However, if polar-
ization is a law that applies no matter what the original consensus, it is highly 
doubtful that in most cases the polarization effect is connected to any epis-
temic improvement. In fact, even occasional convergence toward the truth 
might be achieved accidentally, and thus would fail to provide an argument 
for deliberation. As Sunstein suggests, if group polarization is such a routine 
phenomenon, it would seem to provide a strong argument for turning away 
from democratic deliberation, even where it is feasible, toward either a mere 
aggregation of individual judgments, toward individual deliberation within, 
or a combination of both. Furthermore, this alleged law apparently contradicts 
our prediction that reasoning with others is good at improving the epistemic 
status of individuals and indirectly that of the group as well.
According to Sunstein, the law of group polarization accounts for why, 
after discussion, a group of moderately pro-feminist women will become more 
strongly pro-feminist; why citizens of France become more critical of the 
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid; or why whites 
predisposed to show racial prejudices offer more negative responses to the 
question of whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by Afri-
can-Americans in American cities.17
In order to explain group polarization in such cases, Sunstein turns to two 
well-established (theoretically and empirically) mechanisms underlying group 
polarization. The first involves social influences—that is, the fact that people 
wish to be perceived favorably by other members of the group. Such tenden-
cies create a pressure to conform to the perceived dominant norm. The result is 
to press the group’s position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce 
shifts in individual members—particularly if they hold minority views.
The other mechanism is the limited pool of persuasive arguments to which 
members of the group are exposed, and the path-dependence that this creates 
toward more extreme versions of foregone conclusions. To the extent that indi-
viduals’ positions are partly a function of which arguments they are exposed 
17 All examples are from Sunstein (2002, p. 178).
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to, and to the extent that a group already prejudiced in one direction will pro-
duce a much greater amount of argument for one side than for the other, group 
discussion is likely to reinforce individuals’ prior beliefs. In Sunstein’s words, 
“the key is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speak-
ing purely descriptively) in a particular direction” (p. 159).
Among the general conclusions that Sunstein derives from “the law of 
group polarization” is that deliberation is overrated. In his view, the underly-
ing mechanisms of group deliberation “do not provide much reason for con-
fidence” (p. 187). He even suggests that since we do not have any reason to 
think that deliberation is “making things better rather than worse,” and given 
the mechanisms prevailing behind the law of group polarization, “the results of 
deliberative judgments may be far worse than the results of simply taking the 
median of pre-deliberation judgments” (p. 187). In other words, and in contrast 
to Goodin and Niemeyer, Sunstein believes that deliberation not only changes 
people minds, but changes them for the worse. Are Sunstein’s warnings about 
the risk of group polarization a reason to give up on deliberation with others and 
instead embrace deliberation within or an aggregation of those views? In other 
words, should we give up on the ideal of deliberative democracy? We think not.
First, the problem of group polarization does not constitute a reason to 
embrace deliberation within over external deliberation because, even if the 
pressure to conform had no effect on the lone reasoner (which nothing guar-
antees), the limited pool of arguments present within her own head certainly 
would. Second, such a case against deliberation with others suffers from the 
fact that this law of polarization applies only to a type of communication that 
fails the standard of deliberation as the proponents of the argumentative the-
ory of reasoning and most deliberative democrats define it.
Recall that according to our definition, deliberation must involve a genu-
ine consideration of arguments for and against something. An interpersonal 
exchange in which arguments for both sides are not properly considered does 
not count as “deliberative.” From that point of view, many of the discursive 
exchanges among like-minded people described by Sunstein—be they groups 
of feminists, Anti-American French, or racist Americans—are likely to fall 
short of the requirements of deliberation. The fact that such exchanges lead to 
polarization is therefore not an indictment of deliberation properly construed, 
but of something else which at best deserves the name “discussion.”18 The key 
18 Manin (2005) makes a similar point. He further insists that, contrary to what many authors 
besides Sunstein emphasize (e. g., Bohman, 2007), diversity of views is not enough since even 
people with different perspectives may fail to engage each other’s arguments in the kind of 
adversarial manner conducive to epistemically satisfying deliberation.
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is not just to have diverse arguments, but arguments that respond to each other 
in critical, even conflicting ways.
 Sunstein (2002, p. 177) calls exchanges among like-minded people “enclave 
deliberation” (presumably after Mansbridge, 1994). Yet, even among like-
minded people, there is a difference between an argumentative exchange—
that is, an exchange that genuinely pits arguments against each other—and an 
exchange of diverse but self-reinforcing views. It is not just the starting point 
of the deliberation that matters; deliberative exchanges must be based on argu-
ments that oppose each other. As with individuals, not all like-minded groups 
are bound to polarize. The advantage of a group over an individual, however, 
is that the greater the number of people in the group, the less likely they are 
to be all perfectly like-minded, hence increasing the chances that a conflicting 
perspective can trigger genuine deliberation.19
If we consider only the cases of real deliberation (where arguments for and 
against something are debated), the results are much more positive. Such delib-
eration does tend to produce good reasoning, which in turn produces good 
outcomes, in terms of improving beliefs and related decisions (see Mercier 
and Landemore, 2012). For instance, when people have different and conflict-
ing opinions on issues about which there exists a factual answer, deliberation 
improves performances, sometimes dramatically (see e. g. Sniezek and Henry, 
1989). This also applies when there is no strictly superior answer but one can 
distinguish between better and worse arguments offered in support of a given 
alternative (Laughlin, Bonner and Miner, 2002). The good performance of 
reasoning in the context of genuine deliberation is also supported by many 
studies on teamwork in the workplace and at school (e. g. Michaelsen, Watson 
and Black, 1989; Slavin, 1996), as well as in studies of deliberating citizens in 
various contexts (e. g. Fishkin, 2009; Warren and Pearse, 2008). The consensus 
19 Sunstein briefly raises the possibility that the kind of group exchanges among like-minded 
people that he considers—“enclave deliberation”—does not qualify as proper deliberation. 
To this objection, his terse reply is that, “[i]f deliberation requires a measure of disagreement, 
this is a serious question” (2002, p. 186). He nonetheless goes on to argue that “even like-minded 
people will have different perspectives and views, so that a group of people who tend to like affir-
mative action, or to fear global warming, will produce some kind of exchange of opinion. I will 
urge that in spite of this point, enclave deliberation raises serious difficulties for the participants 
and possibly for society as a whole” (p. 186, our emphasis). We take it that in fact, at this point 
in the paper, and regardless of whatever problems arise from group polarization for individuals 
and society, Sunstein has conceded the main issue: Discussion among like-minded people who 
fail to consider arguments pro and con is not deliberation per se and the law of polarization, 
which turns out to apply only to groups of like-minded people who do not properly deliberate, 
can no longer be used as an argument against democratic deliberation.
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is that the deliberating groups of citizens in these cases ended up with better-
informed beliefs and, where relevant, more compelling policy proposals.20
When we shift the focus from the starting point of deliberation or discus-
sion (whether or not there is a like-minded group) to its content (whether or 
not there is a real exchange of arguments), we can see that not all groups of 
like-minded people are doomed to polarize. Therefore, against what Sunstein 
suggests, the threat of polarization might not be well-addressed by diversifying 
the pool of opinions to include “full information”—knowledge of all the rel-
evant facts, values, options, and arguments that might affect a decision (2002, 
pp. 191-192). Such a requirement, as Sunstein points out, would indeed be 
daunting, should we have to meet it in order to realize the epistemic benefits 
of deliberation. While more information is undoubtedly better than less, it is 
just as important (and perhaps more important) to ensure that people treat 
this information correctly, that is, seek and build opposing arguments on the 
basis of the available information. Depolarization can then occur even if the 
pool of arguments and information is far from exhaustive.21 And even if we 
have access to full information, there is still value to be had in talking things 
out with others.
The argumentative theory of reasoning thus predicts that, more important 
than the initial distribution of information, is the role of participants’ confir-
mation biases. Even full information cannot guarantee depolarization if every-
body’s confirmation bias points in the same direction to begin with. Many 
different confirmation biases can be put to good use, however. When group 
members disagree, each of them is still more likely to find arguments for her 
own side of the issue, but the combined effects of their respective biases guar-
antees a more exhaustive individual exposure to arguments for and against 
a given issue. As a bonus, there is no need for full information prior to the 
debate: full (or at least, more complete) information is precisely one of the 
main achievements of the debate. Far from being a nuisance, the confirmation 
bias ensures a division of cognitive labor within the group.
In our view, Sunstein’s argument blows out of proportion an epistemic fail-
ure that affects only groups of strictly like-minded people that do not engage 
20 Gerry Mackie (2006) provides an important methodological caveat for these studies. 
He notes that the effects of deliberation are “typically latent, indirect, delayed, or disguised,” and 
that therefore some studies may fail to observe them even though they are real. This argument 
therefore strengthens any positive results actually obtained. 
21 Of course, if information—the argument pool—is too limited and too biased, deliberation 
based on it will not achieve miracles. But between the extremes of seriously limited and biased 
information on the one hand and full information on the other, there is a space in which delibera-
tion can have transformative and epistemic properties, even among initially like-minded people.
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in genuine deliberation per se; his argument also fails to see that there is some-
thing more fundamentally problematic than social homogeneity. Thus, the real 
question is: Why do like-minded people fail to consider other arguments, and 
how can we institutionalize collective decision-making so as to remedy this 
phenomenon? The theory of reasoning as arguing predicts that only discursive 
exchanges among like-minded people that do not involve a proper weighing 
of the pros and cons will lead to polarization, but not necessarily discussion 
among people who start with the same information and argument pool but 
engage in proper deliberation, even on a skewed informational basis.
C ONC LU SION
The argumentative theory of reasoning used in this article yields predictions 
regarding the transformative properties of deliberation that should give pause 
to advocates of deliberation within or sheer judgment aggregation, and give 
heart to advocates of external deliberation. The theory allows us to predict 
where deliberation is likely to work well—in contexts that fulfill or approximate 
the normal circumstances for which reasoning was designed, i. e., argumenta-
tive, social contexts—and when it is likely not to—in abnormal contexts, i. e., 
solitary reasoning or non-deliberative discussion among like-minded people.
Most importantly for deliberative democrats, if this theory of reasoning 
is correct, it lends plausibility to the claim implicit in the normative ideal of 
deliberative democracy, that deliberation with others has more epistemic vir-
tues than reasoning on one’s own.
Finally, the argumentative theory of reasoning also suggests that there 
is nothing utopian about the demands placed by deliberative democrats on 
individual reasoning. In its normal, dialogical context, reasoning performs its 
function well; in this context, confirmation biases are actually harnessed to 
epistemic benefits. There is no need to deplore or try to fix the limitations of 
individual reasoning. What matters is to set up the optimal conditions for it: 
genuine deliberation with others.
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